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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes have been settled by arbitration at
ancient Greece.
Phoenicians and desert traders
Polo used contractual arbitration, and Peisistratus
Century B.C. sent arbitrators throughout the

least since the days of
in the time of Marco
of Athens in the Sixth
countryside to settle

t B.A., 1996, Linguistics, Western Washington University; J.D., 2000,
William Mitchell College of Law. The author is currently the manager of ECommerce Services for the National Arbitration Forum and will become that
organization's Corporate Counsel in October, 2000.
1. See Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court's Expansive Approach to
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1499,1502 (1995).
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disputes. 2 However, it was common practice in the English courts for
judges to display severe hostility to arbitration, sensing that arbitration
threatened their judicial positions.3 American judges initially shared this
hostility, but as the industrial revolution swept across the nation,
arbitration agreements became more prevalent and more readily
accepted.4
Reflecting this change in attitude toward arbitration, Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (then called the United States
Arbitration Act), to ensure the validity of these agreements as enforceable
contract provisions.' As a result of amendments to the FAA, courts have
encountered more litigation centered on contractual arbitration.
Last summer, the Third and Eleventh Circuits, within two weeks of
each other, issued opinions involving arbitration agreements in Green
Tree Financial Corporation contracts. 6 The agreements were strikingly
similar, but the holdings were inapposite. 7 In Randolph v. Green Tree,8 the
Eleventh Circuit invalidated an arbitration agreement because the
procedural process of arbitration was unascertainable. 9 In Harris v. Green
Tree,'o the Third Circuit enforced an arbitration agreement even though it
gave Green Tree the option to litigate while requiring the Harrises to
arbitrate their claims."
2.

See ROBERT M. SMITH, ADR FOR FINANcIAL INSTITUTIONS § 5:01 (1998).
3. See id.; see also David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting
Interpretationsof its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 623, 625 (1992). In the past, English
judges received fees for each case they heard. See Alison B. Overby, Arbitrability of
Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1137, 1139 (1986).
Arbitration diminished the number of cases the judges heard and fees they
received for hearing those cases. See id. In England, agreements to arbitrate
existing and future disputes were revocable until the presiding arbitrator rendered
a decision. See id. In 1698, England created statutory arbitration but still allowed
for revocation. See id. Only in 1889 did England codify the rule that parties could
not revoke agreements to arbitrate both existent and future disputes. See id.
4. See Wigner, supranote 1, at 1502.
5. See id. at 1503.
6. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1999)
(compelling arbitration under the arbitration clause in the contract); Randolph v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1159 (lth Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. (2000) (holding arbitration clause unenforceable).
7. The Harris court found that the arbitration clause comported with the
requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act and was therefore enforceable. See
Harris, 183 F.3d at 184. The Randolph court found that the arbitration clause at
issue failed to make clear which party was responsible for arbitration fees and was
therefore unenforceable. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158.
8. 178 F.3d 1149 (lth Cir. 1999).
9. See id. at 1158.
10. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
11. See id.
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Given the dissimilar analyses of the circuit courts, it is not surprising
that the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review Randolph. This case note
first will examine the foundation of contractual arbitration and discuss its
foundations in the FAA and U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Next, this
note will consider the Eighth Circuit's standing on issues similar to those
decided in Randolph and Harris. Part IV will recount the facts and courts'
analyses in the Randolph and Harrisdecisions. Finally, this note will argue
that the Court should continue its strong stance favoring contractual
arbitration when the Court decides Randolph and if the court reviews
Harris.

II. FOUNDATION OF PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Arbitration, a dispute resolution process whereby a neutral third
party renders a decision after two or more parties have stated their case, is12
the most-commonly used form of alternative dispute resolution.
Although some groups are reluctant to support this form, the facts
demonstrate that contractual arbitration typically is the best way to resolve
most consumer disputes. 13 Most opposition to contractual arbitration
arises in the area of arbitration clauses placed in form contracts.
However, statistics show that consumers actually fare better in arbitration
than in court. For example, in federal court, corporations prevail eightyseven percent of the time in suits against individuals.1 4 By comparison, in
5
arbitration proceedings administered by the National Arbitration Forum,'
recent studies show that corporations prevail over individuals only sixty6
three percent of the time.
Further, most Americans prefer arbitration to litigation. 7 Arbitration

12.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1991); SMrrH, supra note 2, at §

5.01.
13.
14.

See infra notes 14-19.
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really

Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 581, 603 (1998).

15. Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minn., the National Arbitration Forum is
one of the world's largest neutral administrators of arbitration services and the
national leader in e-commerce arbitration. Arbitrators on the Forum's select
international panel are independent legal experts-former judges, senior
attorneys and law professors.
16. Studies on file with author.
17. See Roper Poll Reveals Americans'Preferencesfor Resolving Legal Issues; Majority
Believe Arbitration is Their Best Option, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 15, 1999 (available on the

National Arbitration Forum's web site (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.arbforum.com/library.html>).
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is faster, cheaper and potentially less hostile than the courtroom. 8 These
factors work together to provide all parties with access to justice, which
likely has influenced the significant growth of contractual arbitration.
Contractual arbitration, sometimes referred to as "private" or
"commercial arbitration," 9 has been widely used by contracting parties for
many years.2 0 Court-appointed arbitration, on the other hand, just
recently has experienced significant growth.2 ' The arbitration process
typically begins by one party to a transaction inserting a pre-dispute
arbitration clause into the parties' contract. This clause stipulates that all
future disputes will be settled by arbitration. Arbitration clauses usually
contain the name of an arbitration administrator whose procedural rules
are incorporated into the arbitration agreement by reference.
Arbitration administrators are used to prevent bias on behalf of the
arbitrators, since neither party usually has any relationship with the
administrator.
Arbitration administrators coordinate arbitration selection, collect
fees, distribute payment to arbitrators, schedule hearings and handle most
other administrative duties. 22 Three of the most prominent arbitration
administrators are the National Arbitration Forum, the American
Arbitration Association andJ.A.M.S./Endispute. 4
Many industries have used contractual arbitration extensively in the
United States. 25 The financial industry, however, has used arbitration

18. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 624-25.
19. See SMITH, supranote 2. Some groups, such as the Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice (TPLJ) have referred to contractual arbitration as "mandatory arbitration."
The TPLJ argue that even though both parties specifically agreed to the
arbitration clause before the dispute arose such clause should not necessarily be
enforced. See Trial Lawyers for Public Justice web site (visited Jan. 9, 2000)
<http://www.tlpj.org/tlpj/briefs.htm>. The site provides links to briefs written for
the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice's "Mandatory Arbitration Abuse Prevention
Project." See id. The briefs oppose some arbitration clauses to which both parties
had previously agreed. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Alan J. Kaplinksy & Mark J. Levin, Consumer Financial Services
Arbitration: Last Year's Trend Has Become This Year's Mainstay, 54 Bus. LAw., May
1999, at 1405 (explaining that these three leading independent arbitration
administrators recently adopted "due process protocols" to ensure the fairness of
arbitration proceedings).
25.
See SMITH, supra note 2, at § 5:01-2 (citing ROTH ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE 2:1 (1993)). "These industries include

maritime, securities, commodities, international trade,
medical malpractice, and escrow." See id.
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programs only since 1986.6 At first, courts resisted arbitration contracts

but attitudes have shifted since enactment of the FAA. 7
A.

The FAA

In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA.28 Since then, courts have upheld
arbitration agreements in several forms and in several industries. 29 Section
2 of the FAA may be the most prominent and controversial section of the
Act.30 It states:
A written provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.

3'

The U.S. Supreme Court, specifically since the mid-1980s, has
developed a broad interpretation of section 2 . If a transaction involves
interstate commerce, 33 an arbitration agreement covering that transaction
is enforceable as long as it meets the basic requirements of contract law.34
Therefore, most decisions focus on questions of unconscionability,

26. See SMrrH, supra note 2, at § 5:01-03.
27. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
28. See id.; SMrnH, supranote 2, at § 5.06.
29. See id.
30. See Wigner, supra note 1, at 1499-1500 (stating that section 2 of the FAA
has created some confusion in the courts due to its expansiveness).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See 9 U.S.C. § 1. Section 1 states:
"[Clommerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the several
states or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or
in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another,
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State Territory or foreign
nation.
Id.
34.

See infra Part II.B.
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consideration or mutuality, offer and acceptance.35 If an arbitration
36
under the FAA.
agreement meets these standards, courts will enforce it

B.

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

During the past twenty-five years, courts have exhibited a strong
7
The U.S. Supreme
preference for enforcing arbitration agreements.
Court was at the forefront of this trend and most federal and state courts
followed its lead.3 As the courts, specifically the U.S. Supreme Court,
interpreted provisions of the FAA, the old English common law practice
of resisting arbitration lost ground. 9 The change in attitude was neither
Because this shift
subtle nor slow; it was rapid and controversial.40
occurred so quickly, many judges hesitated in adopting a pro-arbitration
stance. 1 U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the past quarter century caused
most other courts to see the benefits of arbitration and follow the Court's
lead.42
Since the mid-1980s, when arbitration cases began gaining
momentum, the Court has addressed contractual arbitration issues
thirteen times.43 Four of the decisions significantly shaped the present

35. See infta Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. SeeJose A. Cabranes, Arbitration and the U.S. Courts: Balancingtheir Strengths,
70 N.Y. ST. B.J., May/Apr. 1998, at 22-23 (stating reasons why courts now favor
arbitration agreements, including flexibility and control of the parties).
38. See id. See, e.g., Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 937 (6th
Cir. 1998) (following the logic in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995) and holding that a choice of law provision in an
arbitration agreement only applies to the substantive law the arbitrator will apply
and not to the validity of the arbitration agreement); In re Piper Funds, Inc., 71
F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that statutory claims are arbitrable and
relying on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34
(1987)); Morrison v. Colorado Permanente Med. Group, 983 F. Supp. 937, 943-44
(D. Colo. 1997) (holding that the FAA preempts state law, thus applying the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning in Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684
(1996)); Baer v. Terminix Int'l Co., 975 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (D. Kan. 1997)
(upholding an arbitration agreement based on the Court's analysis in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)).
39. See Cabranes, supra note 37.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. The "New York Convention of 1990," which encouraged the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards, also contributed
to the change in common law regarding arbitration. See id.
43. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)
(rejecting a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act based upon the failure
to submit to arbitration as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement);
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that the FAA
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FAA.44
of the FAA to
Specifically, these four decisions shaped modern application
45
pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers.

state

of arbitration

1.

law and established

the scope of the

The Southland Decision

In Southland Corp. v. Keating,46 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
questions surrounding the FAA's interaction with state laws.4 7 The Court's

preempted state law which conditioned enforceability of arbitration clause on
compliance with specific notice requirements); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (establishing that provisions of the FAA that make
arbitration provisions in a contract involving commerce enforceable extends the
FAA's scope to the fullest extent of Congress' commerce clause power); Vimar
Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (rejecting as
premature the argument that an arbitration clause may be unenforceable simply
because foreign arbitrators may not apply proper law); First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (holding that decision whether arbitrators or
courts have primary power depends on parties agreement); Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding that a contract
between a securities brokerage firm and customers permitted an arbitration panel
to award punitive damages to customers); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that an age discrimination claim is subject to
"compulsory arbitration" in accordance with the arbitration provision of a
securities registration); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989) (stating that the FAA did not preempt state law that permitted
stay of arbitration if parties agreed to apply state rules of arbitration); United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (holding that court of
appeals was not free to deny enforcement of an arbitrators award on belief that
award was against public policy); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding
that state law allowing wage collection actions to be brought, regardless of a
private arbitration agreement is preempted under the Supremacy Clause, by the
FAA); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(determining that both securities and RICO claims are arbitrable); AT&T Techs.,
Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (holding that
the court, not the arbitrator has the primary power to determine whether parties
to a collective bargaining agreement intended to arbitrate specific grievances);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (stating that a provision of the
California Franchise Investment Law that requires judicial consideration of certain
actions, conflicts with the FAA and violates the Supremacy Clause).
44. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688-89 (holding that the FAA pre-empts state
law); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 273-82 (holding that under some
circumstances the FAA extends to the limit of Congress' commerce power);
Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 226 (holding that statutory claims are
arbitrable under the FAA); Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (holding that the FAA section
2 pre-empts state laws on arbitration and declares that arbitration is a favored
policy).
45. See cases cited supra note 43. The other nine cases mainly addressed the
areas of employment disputes and other areas of contractual arbitration.
46. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
47. Seeid. at 11.
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holding had a significant impact on the FAA, which is used to analyze
arbitration agreements between all kinds of parties.48
The dispute in Southland centered on an arbitration agreement
contained in a franchise agreement.49 The franchisees brought suit
against the franchisor alleging violation of California statutory law and
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty.50 The franchisor responded with the affirmative defense that the
franchisees failed to arbitrate pursuant to the franchise agreement. 51 The
franchisor moved to compel arbitration and the franchisees sought class
certification."
The California Superior Court granted the franchisor's motion but
did not include claims under the California Franchise Investment Law.
The franchisor appealed to the California Court of Appeals, arguing that
the lower court erred in not including the claims under the California law
in its holding.54 The franchisees argued that the Superior Court should
have ordered that arbitration proceed as a class action.55 The Court of
Appeals overturned the Superior Court's decision and ordered that the
parties arbitrate all claims, including those under California law.5 6 The
court held that, under the Supremacy Clause,57 section 2 of the FAA preempted state laws that render arbitration agreements unenforceable.5 8
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
decision and held that the claims under California law were not subject to
arbitration. 9 It concluded that state law was not inconsistent with the FAA

48. See id. at 16 (holding that state laws violate the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution if they are inconsistent with the FAA).
49.

See id.
at 4.

50. See id. The franchisees alleged that the franchisor violated the California
Franchise Investment Law. See id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000-31516 (West
1997)).
51.

See id.

52. See id.The class contained approximately 800 franchisees from California
and the claims were nearly identical to the original action. See id. The court
consolidated all of the actions. See id.
53.
54.

See id.
See id.

55. See id. at 4-5. Class actions are typically inconsistent with the procedural
and financial benefits of arbitration.
56.

See id. at 5.

57.

U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.

58.

See id.

59.

See id.

"The California Supreme Court interpreted the Franchise

Investment law to require judicial consideration of claims brought under that

statute and concluded that the California statute did not contravene the Federal
Act." Id. at 6.
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and remanded the case to the trial court.6° The franchisor then appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.61
2
The Court first looked to the interpretation of the state law at issue.
The California Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require 'judicial
consideration" of all claims brought under it.63 The Court agreed with this

interpretation and found that it was inconsistent with section 2 of the
FAA.64 It therefore directly conflicted with the FAA in violation of the
Supremacy Clause.65
"In enacting [s]ection 2 of the Federal Act, Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." 66 The Court stated
that the FAA places only two limitations on the enforcement of FAAgoverned arbitration agreements. 67 First, the agreements must be part of a
contract involving interstate commerce and, second, the agreements must
be revocable subject to the contract-law standards.""
The Court reaffirmed its view that the FAA governs enforceability of
arbitration agreements in state and federal courts.6 9 The Court analyzed
congressional intent in enacting the FAA and found "strong indications"
that Congress intended both federal and state courts to uphold
arbitration clauses when they meet FAA requirements."
Using this
foundation, the Court held that state statutes that are inconsistent with
the FAA, such as the California statute at issue, violate the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.71
2.

The Shearson/American Express Decision

While Southland enunciated the rule that the FAA preempts
inconsistent

state

law,

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.

McMahon2

60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 10.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Seeid. at 10-11.
68. See id. at 11. The contracts must be either maritime contracts or contracts
"evidencing" interstate commerce. See id.

69. See id. at 12-13 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 12.
Seeid.at 16.
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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statutes.

73

In

Shearson/AmericanExpress, the issue involved a dispute between a securities
brokerage firm and its customers.74
The customers alleged that their broker engaged in "excessive
trading" and gave them false and incomplete information on their
accounts.

75

The customers also made a claim under the Federal Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) .76 The brokers sought
to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties and
the district court granted the motion in part. 77 The district court held that
all of the customers' claims, except the RICO claim, were subject to
arbitration under the arbitration agreement. 78
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision that the RICO claim was not subject to arbitration.79 The
appellate court held that RICO plaintiffs were similar to "private attorneygeneral[s]" and that it would be against public policy to allow RICO
claims to be resolved through arbitration.80

The U.S. Supreme Court, in applying section 2 of the FAA,
overturned the Second Circuit's decision.8 ' The Court noted the strong
public policy in favor of arbitration. 82 The FAA, it explained, imposes a
duty on the courts to "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.""' The
Court then extended this duty to federal statutory claims. 4 It stated that
the burden is on the party opposing arbitration of statutory claims to show

73.
74.

See id. at 222.
See id. at 222.

75. See id. at 223. These claims, if proven, were violations of Section I0b of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 222 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1994)).
76. See 18 U.S.C. 1962 (1994).
77. See Shearson/AmericanExpress, 482 U.S. at 223.
78. See id. at 223-24. The district court rejected the customers' claim that the
arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they were adhesion contracts.

See id.; see also infra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining why RICO claims
are not arbitrable).
79. See Shearson/AmericanExpress, 482 U.S. at 224. The court of appeals found
that the claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were not subject to
arbitration. See id.
80. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
81. See ShearsonlAmericanExpress, 482 U.S. at 226, 242.
82. See id. at 225-26.
83. Id. at 226 (quoting Dean Witter Renolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221

(1985)).
84. See id. ("This duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished
when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.").
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that Congress intended to allow only judicial relief of those claims."5
3.

The Allied-Bruce Terminix Decision
86

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson serves as a milestone for
consumer arbitration law. The parties in this case consisted of consumers
and a company. 7 The contract in dispute contained a pre-dispute
arbitration clause.88

Before selling their home, Mr. and Mrs. Gwin hired Allied-Bruce
Terminix (Terminix) to re-inspect their home for termites.8 9 Terminix
employees conveyed to the Gwins that the house was termite-free. 90
However, the house was infested with termites when the new owners
moved in.91 Litigation ensued in Alabama state court, and Terminix
sought to stay the action pending arbitration pursuant to a contract
between Terminix and the Gwins.92 The district court denied the stay and
the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 9
The Alabama Supreme Court's analysis was based on the FAA
requirement that the contract involved interstate commerce and used a
test based on the parties' intentions to determine whether the contract
did or did not involve interstate commerce.94 The test used by the court
was whether "at the time [the parties entered into the contract] and
accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate
activity."

95

If they did not, section two of the FAA would not apply. 96 The

Alabama Supreme Court held that the parties contemplated that the
transaction would involve only local commerce and upheld the lower
court's denial of the stay.97
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict as

85.

See id. at 227.

86.

513 U.S. 265 (1995).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 268-69.
See id.
See id. at 268.
See id.
See id.

92.

See id. at 269. The homebuyers sued the Gwins, who then cross-claimed

against Terminix. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 268-69 (applying section 2 of the FAA). The Court also noted
that the Alabama Supreme Court found the FAA "inapplicable because the

connection between the termite contract and interstate commerce was too slight."
Id. at 269.
95. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
96. See id.
97. See id.
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to whether the Alabama Supreme Court's analysis, which other state and
some federal district courts embrace, is correct, or whether, as most
federal appellate courts have held, section 2 of the FAA reaches "to the
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power.""
The Court explained that courts should read section 2 of the FAA
broadly.99 It found that the Act's language "involving commerce" is the
equivalent of "affecting commerce," which often is used to show Congress'
intent to expand the statutes' reach to the limits of the Commerce
Clause. 00 The Court looked to the linguistic structure of the statute,
legislative history, prior decisions and the FAA's basic purpose and
policy.0 1 It stated that a narrow reading of the language "involving
commerce" would be inconsistent with the FAA's purpose.1 0 2 It would
create a new and "unfamiliar test" and more litigation.' ° The main
purpose of the FAA is to avoid litigation. 4
Next, the Court analyzed the section 2 language "evidencing a
transaction."'0 5 The Court held that courts must interpret this language by
using a "commerce in fact" analysis instead of a "contemplation of the
parties" analysis.'0 6 Using a "contemplation of the parties" analysis would
invite litigation and allow parties to later assert that they did not
contemplate that their transaction would involve interstate commerce,
thus making their arbitration agreements unenforceable. 7 This analysis
would be inconsistent with the FAA' 00 Also, the legislative history and
Congress' intent weighed heavily in using a "commerce in fact" analysis.' 0
The Court extended its analysis to include a discussion on public
policy,"0 discussing Congress' intent in enacting the FAA and examining
98. Id. at 270. See, e.g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986);
Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984); Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959).
99.

See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 273-74.

100. See id. (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
101. See id. at 273-77. The court could not look to other statutes with the same
language, because the FAA was the only statute with the words "involving
commerce." See id. at 273.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 275.
See id.
See id.

105. See id. at 277. The Court posed the question, "Does 'evidencing a
transaction' mean only that the transaction (that the contract 'evidences') must
turn out, in fact, to have involved interstate commerce? Or does it mean more?"
Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id. at 278.
See id. at 278-79.
See id. at 278.
See id. at 278-79.
See id. at 280-81.
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which parties it benefited. 1"
The Court concluded that Congress
11 2
intended the Act to benefit both consumers and businesses of any size.
Congress enacted the FAA to relieve the time and expense of litigation."'
The Court listed benefits of arbitration, which have become common
appearances in court opinions nationwide."' The list included the fact
that arbitration usually is faster and less expensive than litigation, has
simpler rules of procedure and evidence, is less disruptive to present and
future business dealings between the parties and has more flexible
scheduling options.

Therefore, the Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's
decision to deny Allied-Bruce Terminix's motion to compel arbitration
and held that courts must interpret the FAA using a broad, far-reaching
analysis.116 The Court applied the objective "commerce in fact" standard
instead of the subjective "contemplation of the parties" test when deciding
if a contract evidences "a transaction involving commerce. ,,117
4.

The Casarotto Decision

In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court examined a
Montana statute that placed notice restrictions on arbitration
agreements.119 In Casarotto, a franchisee brought suit against a franchisor
alleging state law and tort claims. 20 The franchisor moved to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the
franchise agreement.
The trial court granted the motion but the
Montana Supreme Court reversed on appeal.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in
finding that the agreement fell within the confines of the FAA, but it also
held that a Montana statute rendered the arbitration clause

111.

See id. at 280.

112.
113.
114.

See id.
See id.
See id. See, e.g., National Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165

F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999); Dorsey v. H.C.P. Sales, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 804, 80708 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding congressional intent was to provide a "less expensive
alternative to litigation" through arbitration).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 273-74, 282.
See id.
See id. at 278; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
See id. at 683.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 683-84.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

13

1088

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 5
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

unenforceable. 2 3 That statute provided, "Notice that [the] contract is
subject to arbitration ... shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the
first page of the contract." 124 The franchise agreement contained an
arbitration agreement, but it appeared
neither on the first page nor was
25
typed in underlined capital letters.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and began its analysis
with section 2 of the FAA. 6 It re-iterated that "[c]ourts may not...
invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions." 27
Section 2 prevents any state law from
invalidating an arbitration agreement based solely on the fact that it is an
Arbitration agreements must meet the same
arbitration agreement.
standards as other contracts
but do not need to meet higher state-statute
29
imposed standards.
The Court, therefore, reversed the Montana Supreme Court's
decision and invalidated the state statute insofar as its applicability to
arbitration agreements that fell within the FAA.' ° It relied heavily upon
its decision and policy arguments in Allied-Bruce Terminix.'23
Courts throughout the country have adopted the Court's position on32
the FAA and pre-dispute arbitration clauses in commercial agreements.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 684.
Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
See id. at 684.
See id. at 686.
Id. at 687.

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 688-89.
131. See id. at 687-88; supra Part II.B.3 (outlining the Court's policy analysis in
Allied-Bruce Terminix).

132. Nearly all courts have upheld these agreements, with one notable
exception. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 273, 291 (Cal. App.
1998). In Badie, a bank sent an amendment to its credit card terms in the mail to
consumers holding credit cards. See id. at 276-77. The amendment included a
pre-dispute arbitration clause. See id. at 277. The court invalidated the clause,
stating that when a bank "attempts to 'recapture' a forgone opportunity by adding
an entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject, issue, right or
obligation addressed in the original contract and which is not within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into" the
contract amendment or change in terms is unenforceable. Id. at 284.
Note that the decision in Badie clearly contradicts section 2 of the FAA.
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). According to section 2, arbitration clauses cannot be
treated differently than other contracts. See id. ("A contract ... shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contact.") The Court in Badie analyzed the arbitration
clause as though it was different from other contract terms. See Badie, 79 Cal.

Rptr.2d at 284. If the amendment had been a change to the financial terms of the
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The Eighth Circuit is no exception, with
decisions spanning from the
3
"Allied-Bruce Terminix era" through 1999.1 3
C. Eighth CircuitDecisions
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first visited contractual
arbitration in 1953, when it held that arbitration agreements do not
eliminate a court's jurisdiction but rather allow the parties to stay any
court proceeding while they pursue arbitration.
The court later
examined several cases where arbitration agreements appeared in
1 35

securities contracts.
The Eight Circuit continually has followed FAA policies in support
of its enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements13 6 and recently
137
restated its position in a case with facts similar to those in Randolph.
The court in Dobbins v. Hawk's Enterprises1 8 stated that it "must
consider the arbitrability of the issues with a healthy regard for the federal
agreement, the court may have upheld it as within the contemplation of the
parties and meeting the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See id.
133. The two most notable Eighth Circuit arbitration decisions are Dobbins v.
Hawk's Enter., 198 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs seeking
judicial review of an arbitration clause on grounds of an unconscionable
arbitration fee must first have applied for an applicable fee waiver, if one is so
available) and Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that the FAA prohibits appeals from interlocutory orders to
proceed with arbitration).
134. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376,
385 (8th Cir. 1953).
135. See Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting
that Minnesota law does not preclude arbitration claims arising under the 1933
Securities Act); Gans v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc., 814 F.2d 493, 497 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that the Commodities Exchange Act did not prevent the
arbitration of claims arising under the Act where provided for by contract);
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable under
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act); Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 571 F.2d 437,
438 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that arbitration did not violate the terms of
regulations set forth by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
136. See Gammaro, 15 F.3d at 95. The court refused to hear the appellant's case
because it lacked jurisdiction. See id. The court lacked jurisdiction, because the
proceeding was "embedded" and section 16 of the FAA prohibited the court to
hear substantive issues until after the proceeding, when the parties sought to
confirm or vacate the arbitration award. See id; see also Pierce, supra note 3,
(outlining public policy favoring arbitration).
137. See Dobbins, 198 F.3d at 715. Like Randolph, Dobbins sought judicial relief
under the Truth in Lending Act, and in both cases the defendants sought
enforcement of arbitration under sales contracts for mobile homes. See infra Part
III.A (outlining the facts in Randolph).
138. 198 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1999).
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policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts about the ability to arbitrate
the issue should be resolved in favor of arbitration.' 39 It also noted that
unusually high filing fees could render an arbitration agreement
unconscionable.'4 0
The court used a state-law standard of
unconscionability to determine if the American Arbitration Association's
filing fees were oppressive to one party, thus rendering the agreement
substantively unconscionable. 4'
The court began its analysis by examining the complaining party's
claim. 42 The party, a consumer, asserted $50 million in punitive and
compensatory damages stemming from violations under the Truth In
Lending Act (TILA) . This claim resulted in a $23,000 filing fee with the
American Arbitration Association.144 The court found that the claim was
unrealistic, but this finding was not the foundation of its analysis. 41 It also
found that the consumers did not ask for a filing fee waiver, an option
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association.'
Also, the
opposing party offered at oral argument to pay the consumers
arbitration
147
fees, thus allowing another option for payment of the fees.
The Eighth Circuit remanded the issue to the district court with
instructions to order the consumers to present a reduced demand for
damages and to seek a waiver or reduction of fees in accordance with the
American Arbitration Association's rules. 48 It also directed the district
court to accept the opposing party's offer to pay the fees if it determined
that the fees still were too high given the consumer's financial situation . 141
This decision is consistent with the trend in other circuits and the
FAA, upholding pre-dispute arbitration agreements. '5 It also follows the
139.

Id. at 717 (citing Keymer v. Management Recruiters, Int'l, Inc., 169 F.3d

501, 504 (8th Cir. 1999)).
140. See id.
141. See id. The party with whom the Court was concerned was a couple who
purchased a mobile home from Carriage Homes. See id. at 716. Courts use a caseby-case analysis when determining unconscionability. See id. at 717.
142. See id. at 716.
143. See id. at 716 n.2.
144. See id. at 717.
145. See id. at 717 n.3.
146. See id. at 717.
147. See id. at 717 n.4.
148. See id. at 717.
149. See id.
150. See Chelsea Square Textiles, Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., 189 F.3d
289, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (compelling arbitration of claims arising from a contract
containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause); Fedmet Corp. v. M/V Buyalyk, 194
F.3d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1999) (sending all claims to arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement in a bill of lading); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175
F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement); P
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U.S. Supreme Court's lead of interpreting the FAA and upholding predispute arbitration agreements that meet the requirements of established
contract law.' 5'
The circuit split that occurred lat summer serves as a backdrop to
examine the FAA and court interpretation of it. While one case clearly is
consistent with the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court and other
federal courts, the other is a direct contradiction.

III. RANDOLPHAND HARRIS
A.

The Randolph Decision

Larketta Randolph initiated the lawsuit Randolph v. Green Tree
Financial Corp.1 2 in 1996.
Randolph purchased a mobile home and
financed it through Green Tree in 1994."' In her complaint, Randolph
alleged that Green Tree 1) violated certain provisions of the TILA when it
required her to obtain "vendor's single interest insurance" but did not
include the requirement in the TILA disclosure, 5 ' and 2) violated the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act by including an arbitration agreement in

& P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 871 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement); First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145
F.3d 647, 653 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying policy considerations to uphold an
arbitration clause in an employment contract); Porter Hayden Co. v. Century
Indem. Co., 136 F.3d 380, 384 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding a pre-dispute arbitration
clause in an insurance contract); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d
926, 935 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying section two of the FAA to enforce a pre-dispute
arbitration clause); Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1998)
(upholding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a National Association of
Securities Dealers contract); Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007,
1014 (11th Cir. 1998) (requiring a member of an organization to arbitrate all
disputes pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained in the
organization's member rules); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.,
992 F.2d 386, 391 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
in a construction contract); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 833
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a defamation
case).
151. See supra Part II.B (outlining prominent U.S. Supreme Court cases
concerning arbitration).
152.
178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
153. See id. at 1151-52.
154. See id. at 1151. Randolph purchased the mobile home from Better Cents
Home Builders, Inc. in Alabama. See id. Better Cents Home Builders named
Green Tree of Alabama, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Green Tree Financial
Corporation, as assignee in their retail installment contracts. See id.
155. See id. at 1151-52. A vendor's single interest insurance "protects a vendor
or lien holder against the costs of repossession in the event of default." Id. at
1151.
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56
her contract requiring that the parties arbitrate all claims.'
In response, Green Tree moved to compel arbitration of Randolph's
claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the retail installment
contract that she signed. 57 The district court granted Green Tree's8
motion and held that all of Randolph's claims must go to arbitration.'1
Randolph appealed and Green Tree moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing
that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction. "9
The appellate court used FAA section 16(a) (3) to determine whether
it had jurisdiction. 64 The threshold question under section 16(a) (3) is

whether the district court's decision was "final." 16' The court held that the

decision was final in accordance with its general test that it "disposed of all
the issues framed by the litigation, leaving nothing to be done but execute
the order.' 62 The court, therefore, established that it did have jurisdiction
under section 16(a) (3).163

After determining jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit examined the T
enforceability of the arbitration clause in the retail installment contract.
Specifically, it considered whether TILA prevented the clause's
enforcement.
The court used a three-step analysis. First, it recognized
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. 6 6 It noted that some
procedural "inherent weaknesses" should not, on their own, render an
arbitration clause unenforceable.1 67 Essentially, the court stated that if an
156. See id. at 1151-52. Randolph also sought class certification of a class
containing members who had entered into similar agreements with Green Tree.
See id. at 1152.
157. See id.

158.

See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424-25 (M.D.

Ala. 1997), rev'd, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552
(2000).
159. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1152.

160.

See id. at 1153. The Court noted that Congress' intent in enacting the

FAA was to create "special rules governing appeals from a district court's

arbitration order." Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 122 F.3d 1242,
1243 (9th Cir. 1997)). The FAA specifically provides courts with guidelines for
establishing jurisdiction.
161. See9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (1994).
162. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1154 (quoting 15B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3914.17 (2d ed. 1992)).
163. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1156 (dismissing the action with prejudice,
stating that the lower court's opinion was final because all of Randolph's claims
were to be arbitrated).
164. See id. at 1157.
165. See id. The Court limited its analysis to the TILA issue, without
considering Randolph's initial allegation that Green Tree also violated the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act. See id. at 1157-58.
166. See id. at 1157.
167. See id. (quoting Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
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arbitration party with a statutory claim can vindicate his or her cause of
action under the statute, arbitration is an appropriate forum to bring his
or her dispute.'
Second, the Eleventh Circuit examined a caveat to their first
analytical step. 6 9 It stated that some procedural weaknesses in arbitration
could create sufficient barriers to vindicating statutory claims, rendering
an arbitration clause unenforceable. 70 If an arbitration clause governs an
arbitration process that is procedurally unsound, and defeats
the
"remedial purpose of [a] statute," the clause will be unenforceable. 7'
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit looked specifically to the arbitration
agreement between Randolph and Green Tree and applied the above
standards. 72 The arbitration clause, among other things, failed to name
an established arbitration administrator or arbitrator. 7' The court's main
concern focused on the absence of essential information in the arbitration
7
clause, typically ascertainable by naming an arbitration administrator.1 4
The clause did not specify the amount or process of paying filing
fees, did not have an option for indigent parties to waive fees or establish
7

any methods to determine who would be responsible for costs.

The

76

court specifically was concerned with the plight of consumers.1 The
court was concerned that even if Randolph, a consumer, prevailed in
arbitration, she still would be responsible for fees and costs.
The court also found that the clause failed to specify any procedural
rules.7 7 The clause stated, "All disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from
1062 (11th Cir. 1998)).
168. See id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28
(1991)).
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id.
See id.
See id. (citing Paladino,134 F.3d at 1062).
See id. at 1158.

173. See id.; supra Part II (explaining the arbitration process). Several
organizations serve as neutral third-party arbitration administrators with
established procedural rules and fees. See Kaplinsky & Levin, supranote 24.
174. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158. When a contract names an arbitration
administrator, the contract incorporates the administrator's rules by reference. See
SMITH, supra note 2.
175. See id. The National Arbitration Forum and American Arbitration
Association both have provisions in their rules whereby individuals suffering from
financial hardship can apply to the organizations for fee waivers. See Dobbins v.
Hawks Enter., 198 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999); National Arbitration Forum, Code
of Procedure (Sept. 1, 1999) (visited Jan. 1, 2000) <http://www.arb-forum.com>.
176. See Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1158.
177.
178.

See id.
See id.
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this Contract, or the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire
Contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator
selected by Assignee with consent of Buyer(s)." 9 The court found that
the clause, to be enforceable, must specify that parties would follow an
arbitration administrator's rules or negotiate their own procedural rules.'8 °
Although Green Tree argued that it typically used an arbitration
provider, the court found that the clause was unenforceable. 8' The court
held that the clause failed to "provide the minimum guarantees required
to ensure that Randolph's ability to vindicate her statutory rights will not
be undone by steep filing fees, steep arbitrators' fees, or other high costs
of arbitration."8 2
In sum, because the arbitration fees, costs and procedural guidelines
were unascertainable in the arbitration clause, the court determined that
Randolph might have been unable to vindicate her statutory claims under
TILA.
Therefore, the court held that the arbitration84 clause was
unconscionable and remanded the case to the district court.

B.

The Harris Decision

In Harrisv. Green Tree FinancialCorp., 's Charles and Christine Harris
(the Harrises) brought suit against Green Tree when they were unsatisfied
with a home improvement program in which they enrolled.8 6 The
Harrises' suit included alleged violations under RICO, the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and other claims. 7
Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement the Harrises signed when they agreed to participate in a home
improvement program.' 8 Specifically, the arbitration clause appeared in a

179. Id.at 1151.
180. See id. at 1158-59 (stating that the clause was unenforceable because it did
not specify an arbitration administrator or any rules governing any arbitration
proceeding).
181.

See id.

182. Id. (citing Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062
(11th Cir. 1998)).
183. See id. at 1158-59.
184. See id. at 1159.
185. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
186. See id. at 176. Charles and Christine Harris were putative class members
along with Willie and Nora Nelson. See id. at 176 n.2.
187. See id. at 177. The other claims were promissory estoppel, breach of
fiduciary duty and tortuous interference. See id.
188.

See id.
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secondary mortgage contract to finance improvement costs."'
The Harrises argued that the home improvement scheme was
fraudulent.' 90 They alleged that Green Tree recruited contractors to
aggressively solicit business from unsophisticated senior citizens and
others. 9'
Once the contractors secured a contract, they would
immediately assign the financing agreements to Green Tree.' 9
The arbitration agreement that the Harrises signed appeared in
small print at the bottom of the back page of a standardized contract.9
The Harrises alleged that they were required to sign the contract before
the contractors would perform any work on their home.' 94
After the parties signed the contract, the contractors began work on
the Harrises' home.9
The Harrises alleged that "the contractors either
did not perform the work specifically promised in the contracts, or
performed the promised work, but in an unsatisfactory manner." 96 When
the Harrises complained to Green Tree, they allegedly did not receive an
adequate response.197
When Green Tree moved to compel arbitration, the Harrises filed a
motion opposing arbitration based on theories of unconscionability and
lack of mutuality. 198 The district court issued a Memorandum and Order
denying Green Tree's motion based on these issues. 99
2 00
On appeal, the Third Circuit first examined the issue of mutuality.
It stated that every party to a contract must provide consideration for the
contract to be valid, but it need not be comprised of "reciprocal
promises. " 20 ' As long as both parties to an arbitration agreement provide
consideration, the terms of an arbitration clause may be dissimilar as to
189. See id.
190. See id. at 176.
191. See id. The Harrises asserted that Green Tree solicited the contractors to
obtain high-interest secondary mortgage contracts. See id. The Harrises alleged
that Green Tree instructed the contractors to market themselves as Federal
Housing Authority and Housing and Urban Development approved dealers of
home improvement services. See id.
192. See id. at 176-77,
193. See id. at 177.
194. See id. at 176.
195. See id.
196. Id.at 177.
197. See id. The Harrises alleged that they did not receive what they had
bargained for but were nevertheless "saddled with a sizeable debt." Id.
198. See id. at 178.
199. See id. The Harrises also contended that the clause was unenforceable,
because they were fraudulently induced to enter into the secondary mortgage
contract. See id.
200. See id. at 179-81.
201. See id. at 180 (citing RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 79 (1981)).
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2

the promises of each party.
The agreement between Green Tree and the Harrises stipulated that
the Harrises were bound to arbitrate all claims while Green Tree could
litigate any claims it brought against the Harrises.' ° For this reason, the
204
lower court had held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.
The Third Circuit disagreed, stating, "As long as the requirement of
consideration is met, mutuality of obligation is present, even if one party is
more obligated that the other. 2 0 5 The court held that the district court's
decision was in error and stated, "It is of no legal consequence that the
arbitration clause gives Green Tree the option to litigate arbitrable
issues
206
arbitration."
invoke
to
Harrises
the
requiring
while
in court,
The Third Circuit next considered unconscionability and conducted
a two-part analysis: 1.) whether the agreement was procedurally
unconscionable; and 2.) whether it was substantively unconscionable. 207
Procedural unconscionability, the court explained, arises if the
execution of the contract creates an atmosphere of "unfair surprise" for
one party.20 8 The Harrises argued that the contract was procedurally
unconscionable, because the arbitration
clause appeared in fine print and
9
agreement.
the
of
page
back
on the
The Third Circuit found that the clause was not procedurally
2 10
unconscionable and based its decision on case law and the FAA.
202.
203.

See id.
See id. at 177-78. The agreement stated:

Notwithstanding anything hereunto the contrary, we retain an option to
use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or
other security agreement relating to the real property secured in a
transaction underlying this arbitration agreement, or to enforce the
monetary obligation by the real property, or to foreclose on the real
property agreement. Such judicial relief would take the form of a
lawsuit. The institution and maintenance of an action for judicial relief
in a court to foreclose upon any collateral... shall not constitute a
waiver of the fight of any party to compel arbitration.
Id.
204. See id. at 178.
205. Id. at 181 (citing Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987)). "Modern contract law recognizes that, 'if the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of... equivalence in the
values exchanged."' Id. (quoting Greene, 526 A.2d at 1195).
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id. Courts generally look to the process of execution and the form of
the agreement, including size of print and ambiguous language. See id.
209. See id. at 182.
210. See id.
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Specifically, it relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Casarotto,
which analyzed a Montana statute requiring strict guidelines for the
appearance of arbitration agreements. 21' The Court held that state
statutes cannot impose any standards in arbitration clauses that are not
imposed on other contracts pursuant to the FAA.212 Applying the Court's
decision, the Third Circuit held that the Green Tree clause was not
procedurally unconscionable. 211
The Third Circuit then focused on the issue of substantive
unconscionability.2 1 4

The court stated that a contract is substantively

unconscionable if its terms are "grossly favorable to one side" and the
other side does not assent to those terms. 215 The Harrises argued that the
arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because of lack of
mutuality, and the agreement did not require consent of the Harrises
regarding Green Tree's choice of arbitrator. 16
The appellate court disagreed with the Harrises' claims.1 7 It stated
that inequality of bargaining power on its own will not invalidate an
agreement and re-iterated its holding on the mutuality issue.
It also
found that the Harrises' claim that the arbitration clause is unenforceable
because Green Tree is not required to obtain their consent in the process
of arbitrator selection was unfounded. 2 9 The court determined that the
contract expressly stated that the Harrises must consent to the choice of
arbitrators. 2 0 Furthermore, if the parties could not decide, the FAA
provides that either party may petition the court to appoint an
221
arbitrator.
In sum, the court held that the arbitration agreement between Green
Tree and the Harrises was valid and enforceable and was not void for
unconscionability or lack of mutuality.22 2 It reversed the district court's
decision and remanded the case with orders to grant Green Tree's motion

211.
212.

See id. at 182-83; supraPart II.B.4 (outlining the decision in Casarotto).
See Harris, 183 F.3d at 182-83.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
at
See id.
See id.at
See id.at
See id.at
See id.
at
See id.

220.

See id.
at 177, 183. The arbitration agreement stated, "All disputes, claims,

183.
181.
183.
184.
183-84.

or controversies ...shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator

selected by us with consent of you." Id. at 177.
221. See id.
at 183; 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
222. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 184.
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to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.2 3

IV. HOW THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE RANDOLPHAND
HARRIS
As it stands now, the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewing Randolph. This
review was likely, because the Randolph and Harris decisions occurred
within two weeks of each other and the courts interpreted similar
arbitration clauses differently. Also, because arbitration is such a fastgrowing method of alternative dispute resolution, the Court likely will
want to address these issues early as it did in Allied-Bruce Terminix and
22 4
Casarotto.
When the Court hears Randolph, the result likely will not be
surprising. Using a solid foundation of substantive law and public policy,
the Court likely will overturn Randolph and, if given the opportunity to
hear it, affirm Harris.
A.

Substantive Law

The Court need not look further than its own decisions to affirm
Harris. The Court has strongly upheld pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between consumers and businesses. 225 Even when these agreements
appear in standardized form contracts, also referred to as "adhesion
contracts," the Court has upheld them.226
The Court in Casarotto specifically addressed one of the Harrises'
main arguments.
The Harrises argued that the contract was
unconscionable because the arbitration clause appeared on the back page
of an adhesion contract, and it was not typed in a font that brought
attention to the clause.2 27
In Casarotto, the Court held that statutes
requiring arbitration clauses to meet higher standards than other
contracts were void because they violated the FAA. 22 a The arbitration

223.
224.

See id.
See supra Part II.B.3-4 (outlining the Allied-Bruce Terminix and Casarotto

decisions).
225.
226.

See supraPart II.B.3 (outlining the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision).
See supra Part II.B.3 (outlining the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision).

Adhesion contracts are "[s]tandardized contract form[s] offered to consumers of
goods and services on essentially 'take it or leave it' basis .... " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1991). Although "these contracts are not the result of
traditionally 'bargained' contracts ... not every such contract is unconscionable."
Id.
227. See supra Part III.B (outlining the Harrisdecision).
228.

See supra Part II.B.4 (outlining the Casarottodecision).
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229
agreement in Casarotto appeared in regular type, just as it did in Harris.
Although a statute is not at issue in Harris,the Court would use the same
analysis under the FAA to conclude that arbitration agreements need not

meet stricter standards than other contracts.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Randolph that it had appellate
jurisdiction over the district court's holding is a minority view that the
Court likely will overturn. Only two other circuits have held that an order
compelling arbitration is a "final decision" under the FFA.2 0 Eight other
circuits, however, have held that these decisions are not subject to
appellate review. 211
If the Eleventh Circuit followed the majority view, it would not have
heard the appeal and thus would not have reached the issue of the
arbitration agreement's enforceability. The Court likely will use this issue
to determine that the Eleventh Circuit's decision was erroneous. Even if
the Court agrees with the minority view and holds that the Eleventh
Circuit did have jurisdiction, it likely will disagree with the contractual
issues.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the arbitration clause in Randolph was
unenforceable because the procedural elements of the arbitration process
were not ascertainable. 32 The Third Circuit in Harrissuggested a possible
solution under the FAA's section 5.*3 Section 5 states that if no arbitrator
229. See supra Part III.B (outlining the Harrisdecision).
230. See Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding that an order compelling arbitration is final if the order disposes of all
other issues in the case); Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1276 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that the district court's order compelling arbitration was final and
thus subject to appeal).
231. See Cook v. Erbey, 207 F.3d. 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissing an
appeal of a district court's order compelling arbitration); Seacoast Motors v.
Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626, 628-29 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that the court lacked
appellate jurisdiction over a district court's order compelling arbitration); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating
that orders arising from embedded proceedings are non-appealable); In re Pisgah
Contractors, Inc., 117 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1997); Napleton v. General Motors
Corp., 138 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court does not have
jurisdiction over appeals where a district court compels arbitration); Altman
Nursing, Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp., 84 F.3d 769, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an order compelling arbitration is an embedded proceeding and thus not
subject to appellate review); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58,
60-61 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the
appeal of a lower court's decision to compel arbitration in an embedded
proceeding); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir.
1994) (dismissing an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an order
compelling arbitration).
232. See supraPart III.A (outlining the Randolph decision).
233. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1999)
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or arbitration administrator is named in the arbitration agreement, either
party may apply to the court, which must then "designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they
had been specifically named therein.

... 234

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Randolph was erroneous because it
found that the primary reason for denying Green Tree's motion to
compel arbitration was the lack of specificity regarding arbitration
procedures in the agreement. 25 Either party, if knowledgeable of the
Court's view, could then have filed an application to the court pursuant to
Section 5 of the FAA. 2 6 However, once the court issued its opinion, Green
Tree's only option was to appeal.
The precise language of the FAA clearly favors Green Tree. In the
future, however, Green Tree would benefit from the use of an established
and impartial arbitration administrator, such as the National Arbitration
Forum or the American Arbitration Association. The issue in Randolph
would have been moot had Green Tree specified an arbitrator
administrator and an appeal would have been unnecessary.
B.

Public Policy

In its several decisions interpreting the FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court
has enunciated the strong public policy in favor of arbitration. This policy
is likely to be a factor in the Court's decision when it decides Randolph and
perhaps hears the Harrisappeal. Public policy in favor of arbitration also
stems from several other sources.
Some consumer-rights groups have adopted a supportive view of
arbitration, including pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
The
Consumers Union of the United States, which publishes Consumer Reports,
strongly advises consumers to insist on pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in home-improvement contracts.23 7 This advice even appears in a book

(stating that the FAA section 5 provides for situations where an arbitration
agreement does not include procedural guidelines, either expressly or by
reference).
234. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
235.
236.
237.

See supra Part III.A (outlining the Randolph decision).
See9 U.S.C. § 5.
See CAROL HAAS, THE CONSUMER REPORTS LAw BOOK:

YOUR GUIDE TO

RESOLVING EVERYDAY LEGAL PROBLEMS 364 and inside cover (1994) (stating that the

Consumers Union of the United States was established in 1936 "to provide
consumers with information and advice on products, services, health and personal
finance").
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written for consumers as a self-help legal guide.2 8
Lewis Maltby of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also is a
strong supporter of arbitration, primarily in the area of employment law.
He lists its main asset as being more affordable than traditional litigation,
thus providing more citizens with access to justice. 2 9 Arbitration allows
many people who 2cannot
afford the rising costs of litigation to settle
4
disputes affordably.

0

Also, the results of a recent study show that most Americans favor
arbitration over litigation for settling disputes. 2 ' They believe that lawsuits
are not worthwhile and prefer impartial legal experts to handle their
disputes. 42
Fifty-nine percent of Americans would choose arbitration over
litigation, and when informed that the cost of arbitration could be
seventy-five percent less than a lawsuit, the percentage of those favoring
arbitration jumped to eighty-two.24 3 Given these numbers, and the other
strong support for arbitration, arbitration appears to be a win-win
situation for all involved parties. The Court likely will not ignore these
strong policy considerations when hearing an arbitration case, especially
when it resolutely used them in its previous decisions. Moreover, major
arbitration providers have taken steps to ensure that all parties receive fair
and just hearings.
For example, the National Arbitration Forum has created an
"Arbitration Bill of Rights" which guarantees such safeguards as
reasonable time periods, affordable costs, impartial arbitrators, and an
overall "fundamentally fair process." 2

44

Also, the National Arbitration

Forum is the only arbitration administrator that requires its arbitrators
245
follow substantive law when rendering their decisions.
With these pro238. See id.
239. See Lewis L. Maltby, PrivateJustice: Employment Arbitration & Civil Rights, in
ARBITRATION Now 3 (1997). Lewis L. Maltby is the director of the American Civil
Liberties Union's National Taskforce on Civil Liberties in the Workplace. See id. at
2. He states that an employee, to secure a plaintiffs attorney in a dispute with his
or her employer, would need to have at least $60,000 in "provable damages" which
do not include intangible damages such as pain and suffering. See id. at 25.
240. See id.
241. See Roper Poll, supra note 17. The Institute for Advanced Dispute
Resolution, in connection with the National Arbitration Forum conducted the
Roper Starch survey. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See National Arbitration Forum, Bill of Rights with Commentary (visited Jan.
9, 2000) <http://www.arb-forum.com/other/index.html>.
245. See National Arbitration Forum, Code of ProcedureRule 20(A) (visited Jan. 9,
2000) <http://www.arb-forum.com/library/code.html> ("Arbitrators have the
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cedural safeguards, consumers and businesses alike can have their
disputes settled in a forum that does not take as long and is less expensive
than litigation while receiving the same or similar results they would have
received in court.
All of these policy arguments strongly favor the present state of
arbitration law in the United States. While the courts equally apply
substantive law and public policy, it is easy to see why the common law
manifests a preference for upholding pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court, in reviewing Randolph, likely will continue its longstanding position in favor of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Since the
mid-1980s, as the Court favored these contracts, policy arguments arose
from several areas strengthening the already solid law of contractual
arbitration. Therefore, the Court likely will overturn Randolph and, if it
hears the case, consequently affirm Harris.

powers provided by this Code, the agreement of the parties, and the applicable
substantive law.") The American Arbitration Association's arbitrators may render
decisions on what they believe is just and equitable. See American Arbitration
Association, Commercial Rules Rule R-45 (a) (visited Mar. 4, 2000)
<http://www.adr.org> ("The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the
arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract.").
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